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Nobel: No change 
The Nobel peace prize awanled to Bishop 
Cartos Belo and Jose Ramos Horta in October 
1996 gave rise to hopes that the genuine 
dialogue and respect for human rights 
required to bring peace to East Timor could 
at last be fostered. Such hopes have yet to be 
fulfilled on the ground and in the 
international arena. 
Inside East Timor, arbitrary arrests, torture and even extrajudicial executions persist. 
The office established in Dili by the 
Indonesian National Commission for Human 
Rights (KOMNAS HAM) has proven to be 
ineffective. The United Nations has not been 
allowed to deploy a human rights presence on 
the ground despite the commitments made to 
the international community at the UN 
Commission on Human Rights in April 1996. 
Although the Indonesian government 
responded cautiously to Bishop Belo's award, 
its indirect pressures and rumours of plots to 
assassinate the bishop have fuelled ongoing 
protests against the occupation in East Timor. 
Faltering response 
The international community is having diffi-
culties crafting a coherent response to this 
situation. The Tripartite Talks under UN 
auspices, scheduled for 21December1996, were 
postponed to allow the new UN secretary-
general time to develop a strategy for narrowing 
the gap between the Portuguese and Indonesian 
positions. No date has been fixed for another 
round of the All-inclusive Intra-East Timorese 
Dialogue; the recommendations made by the 
Dialogue in March 1996 remain unfulfilled. 
Furthermore, there is no indication that the 
government oflndonesia is willing to negotiate 
with leaders of the Timorese resistance, despite 
recommendations to this effect by the Nobel 
laureates in Oslo. There is also uncertainty over 
how Jakarta can be persuaded to implement 
the agreement on a UN human rights presence, 
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reached at the UN Commission on Human 
Rights (UNCHR) in 1996. 
EU silence 
The European Union has been silent on 
Indonesia's failure to comply with its 
commitments to the UN Commission on Human 
Rights, despite the provisions for an active EU role 
in promoting human rights spelt out in the 1996 
EU Common Position on East Timor, and 
notwithstanding Portuguese and Irish pressure 
for a more outspoken approach. This silence is 
unacceptable. Unless the government of 
Indonesia implements the agreementfor an on-
site UN human rights presence and takes real 
steps to improve the situation on the ground (by 
releasing political prisoners, as Bishop Belo 
suggested in Oslo) before the UN Commission on 
Hum an Rights convenes in March 1997, the EU 
should acknowledge its strategy of engagement 
has failed and promote a strong resolution on 
East Tim or in the 53rd session of the UNCHR. 
There is also a need for more European 
diplomatic support for UN peacemaking. The 
new UN secretary-general will require the backing 
of friendly states in order to exercise his mandate 
more actively in this area. The European Union, 
the United States and key Asian governments 
should signal their willingness to join a UN 
support group on East Tim or if the opportunity 
arises in 1997. 
Progress on EU aid? 
The European Union is moving ahead on its 
pledge to develop an aid package for East Timor. 
In November, the Council of Ministers reiterated 
its request that the European Commission (EC) 
formulate proposals for assistance in the areas of 
public health, water and sanitation, and education. 
It is envisaged that this assistance will be 
channelled through European and East Timorese 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs), 
including the churches. 
This initiative provides the European Union 
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with an unprecedented opportunity to use 
positive measures to foster development, human 
rights and peace inside East Timor. Yet it is 
essential that the EC formulate a strategy which 
sets out an appropriate multi-sectoral focus with 
a significant gender dimension, ensures that no 
EU assistance is channelled through Indonesian 
government institutions and ensures that the 
military agrees to respect the minimal conditions 
of confidentiality and access required for 
effective development work. It is also important 
for the EC and EU member states to broaden the 
dialogue with East Timorese NGOs and churches 
and with European NGOs working on East 
Timor to ensure that their rich experience is 
fully utilised during the European Union's 
planning process. 
Summary 
Disappointment in the . aftermath of the 
award of the Nobel peace prize and with 
the failure of the Irish government to 
effect any real change in European Union 
policy on East Timor while holding the 
presidency last year are examined in this 
issue of Timor Link. We look at the 
consequences of the Balibo killings, and at 
how Indonesia's involvement in the deaths 
remains overlooked. A leading academic 
lawyer details the arguments for a revision 
of the International Court of Justice's 
ruling that Portugal cannot take cases on 
behalf of East Timor. We also examine the 
four essential conditioqs for peace 
outlined by Bishop Belo; look at the 
European Union's options for action 
following the adoption of its Common 
Position last year; and round up news 
from Britain, the Nobel award ceremony, 
and international conferences, along with 
the latest statements from UK and Irish 
bishops. 
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ANALYSIS 
Opportunity 
blocked? 
When Ireland took over the presidency of 
the European Union (EU) on 1 July 1996, 
hopes were high that it could initiate 
positive action on East Timor (see Timor 
Link 37). Yet, as EILIS WARD explains, 
those hopes were dashed, largely on the 
rocks of EU foreign policy positions. 
In the months prior to taking up the EU presidency, the Irish government made a 
commitment to give priority to East Timor 
when in office. In a personal article in a 
national newspaper, foreign affairs minister 
Dick Spring set out six goals, including a 
(selective) arms embargo against 
Indonesia, an end to the Indonesian 
occupation of East Timor, the release of 
resistance leader, Xanana Gusmao, and the 
establishment of full human rights for the 
East Timorese people. 
These aims were later included in a briefing 
document which indicated the government's 
priorities while occupying the presidency. 
The East Timor Ireland Solidarity Campaign, 
and other groups throughout Europe , saw 
signs that a breakthrough might be at hand. It 
was hoped that Ireland, with support from 
Portugal , could use its position to build a 
strong pro-East Timor coalition within the 
EU , counteracting the interests of bigger 
powers. Specifically, local activists hoped that 
a UN hum an rights office cou ld be 
establi sh ed in Dili rather than in Jakarta, 
despite the April 1996 agreement between the 
UN Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) 
and Indonesia. 
Six months later, with the presidency in the 
hands of the Dutch government, none of 
those hopes have been realised. It seems that 
the framework established by the Common 
Position (CP) on East Timor, adopted by the 
Council of Foreign Ministers just before 
Ireland took up the presidency, set limits on 
what action could be contemplated. As far as 
any future EU action on Indonesia is 
concerned, the CP now appears to be the 
guiding rule. 
Given the restrictions the CP placed on the 
Irish presidency, some questions need to be 
answered. First, was it naive to expect that a 
single small state could make any impact on 
the complex process of foreign policy making 
within the EU? Second, what were the 
constraints that prevented Ireland generating 
support for stronger action on East Timor? 
The answers may show how far other EU 
member states can take action in the future. 
Consensus 
In retrospect, because the CP on East Timor 
was published before Ireland took up the 
presidency, the limits to any possible action 
were already established. Under the EU 
Common Foreign and Securitv Policy (CFSP) 
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agreement , CPs emerge after a protracted 
period of inter-governmental negotiations 
between member states which move forward 
only bY consensus , as laid out in the 
Maastricht Treaty of 1992 . This process 
ha,ing been completed , it would be difficult 
for any member state, eYen one holding the 
presidency, to open the debate again. 
Indeed, the failure by Spring to mention 
East Timor in his opening address to the 
European Parliament on 17 July 1996 was 
recognition of this . And the rejection by 
several other members states (particularly 
Germany) of Ireland's attempt to 
congratulate Bishop Carlos Belo and Jose 
Ramos Horta on their Nobel peace prize in 
October, showed the Irish just how little room 
there was for manoeuvre. 
This raises an important question about the 
power of the EU president in foreign policy 
matters. As part of the checks and balances 
within the EU, the power of the presidency is 
limited. The government in office can set an 
agenda but only one based on consensus . 
Thus, the agreement of all member states is 
required on proposals no matter how 
powerfully motivated or engaged any 
particular presidency may be. 
Nevertheless, holding the presidency does 
give the government in that position many 
opportunities to raise issues and keep 
awareness alive. In this regard, the absence of 
any reference to East Timor in Spring's 
opening address must be seen as a missed 
opportunity. The CFSP is a constraint on 
individual actions, and is intended to be 
exactly that; yet holding the presidency does 
offer any state, regardless of its size and 
power, some room to keep up the pressure. 
Lip service? 
It could be argued that Ireland's elected 
representatives were hypocritical in their pre-
presidency comments. In fact, on a visit to 
Ireland last June, Ramos Horta said the 
country's support for East Timor was mere 
' lip service'. And certainly, we mustjudge the 
sincerity of our politicians' words by their 
actions. In their defence, the government 
might argue that Ireland's position on East 
Timor is inseparable from that of the 
European Union. 
But there were other institutional 
constraints. Diplomats are not best at dealing 
with situations where human rights abuses are 
an issue. This is not because they are heartless 
but because their training and practice 
inclines them to avoid conflict and keep 
communication lines open - maintaining the 
culture of international diplomacy is an end 
in itself. Within the EU, diplomats have 
become accustomed to cooperating with their 
counterparts in other member states. 
This leads to another constraint - what has 
been called the 'fraternity of free trade' - in 
which human rights and other non-economic 
issues are secondary to the real concern of 
maintaining trade. It would be difficult to 
argue that Ireland's economic interests in 
Indonesia dictated policy, but major 
economic powers within Europe are 
concerned to protect their trade. with 
Indonesia. The European Union now views 
the members of the Association of South East 
Asian Nations (ASEAN) less as a threat than 
as providing important economic potential. 
As a small, economically weak power within 
the European Union, it is highly likely that 
Ireland considered the 'greater' economic 
interests of other EU member states as a valid 
constraint on political action. 
Naive? 
Does the disappointment mean that activists 
were naive? I would suggest that it does not. 
The positions adopted by Ireland's elected 
leaders in advance of the presidency 
produced a sensitised e lectorate and a 
sensitised administration. This awareness is a 
powerful weapon. Politicians can be forced to 
account for their words and actions by lobby 
groups and a politicised public. Human 
rights work and solidarity work is as much 
about changing the wider culture within 
which decisions are made as it is about 
achieving specific policies. 
Hence, lobbying groups must keep up the 
pressure on national governments. Although 
the CFSP involves, by definition, a loss of 
sovereignty for each member state, the 
process of foreign policy formation within 
the Union is still inter-governmental. Activists 
must increase cross-border interaction and 
collaboration to ensure that the same 
demands are emerging from all member 
states. The reality within Europe now is that 
national governments are unlikely to take 
major initiatives on their own, particularly 
when a CP has been reached. Lobbyists and 
human rights activists need to respond 
accordingly by adopting their own common 
positions. As the EU becomes an even bigger 
trading bloc, the role of civil groups in 
promoting human rights becomes ever more 
significant. • 
• Eilis Ward is a PhD candidate in Political 
Science at Trinity College, Dublin. 
HUMAN RIGHTS UPDATE 
Atmosphere of fear 
On 16 October 1996 the Melbourne-based East Timor Human Rights Centre 
(ETHRC) published a report documenting 
continued arbitrary arrests and systematic 
torture by security forces. In Continuing 
human rights violations in East Timor the 
Centre also records the unfair trial and 
conviction of many of the people charged 
following protests in October 1995 and June 
1996, extrajudicial executions and persistent 
impunity for human rights violators. The 
Centre states that there is 'an atmosphere of 
fear with people being regularly subjected to 
intimidation, beatings, rape and other acts 
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of repression by the Indonesian authorities'. 
In January, the ETHRC also reported that 
Mariano Mendonca, aged 22, had allegedly 
been killed by an Indonesian intelligence 
agent on 4 November 1996. That killing 
brought to 13 the number of extrajudicial 
executions documented by the Centre in 
1996. 
Urgent action bulletins recently released by 
other human rights organisations suggest that 
such grave violations persist: 
• 28 November 1996: Amnesty International 
(AI) issued a bulletin documenting the 
arrest of five East Timorese men in 
connection with the killing of Sergeant-
Major Juliao Fraga. AI expressed serious 
concern for their safety, and reiterated its 
concern for the safety of Azito Freitas, who 
had been detained earlier in connection 
with the same incident. On 18 December 
AI released an update indicating that three 
other East Timorese men had been 
arrested in connection with the Fraga 
killing. Amnesty repeated its serious 
concern for the safety of these detainees, 
'particularly in the light of reports that two 
had been tortured'. 
• 4 December 1996: The World Organisation 
Against Torture (OMCT) released a 
statement expressing concern about the 
detention of Pantaleao and Joao Pires, by 
security forces, for their alleged role in 
organising a peaceful demonstration on 
25 November. OMCT expressed its fear 
that 'if they are in detention they may be 
subjected to torture and ill-treatment'. 
• 8 January 1997: Amnesty International 
issued a bulletin documenting the arrest 
of eight East Timorese men after violent 
incidents surrounding Bishop Belo's 
return to Dili . AI expressed its fear that 
the detainees might be tortured or ill-
treated 'because of the routine use of 
torture and ill-treatment by the security 
forces in attempting to extract confessions 
for alleged crimes or information about 
others'. 
Indonesia ignores UNCHR 52 
In addition to failing to put an end to such 
abuses, the government of Indonesia has 
not implemented the commitments it 
agreed to at the 52nd session of the UN 
Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) 
in 1996. Despite efforts by the UN Centre 
for Human Rights, the memorandum of 
understanding enabling the establishment 
of an on-site UN human rights presence 
agreed to at UNCHR 52 has not yet been 
signed by Indonesia. Given Indonesia's 
failure to comply with its international 
obligations and persistent grave violations 
on the ground, it will be difficult for the 
international community to shirk its duty 
to exert more concerted pressure on 
Indonesia at UNCHR 53. • 
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EAST TIMOR: lime for change 
Timor, area 7,400 square miles, is one of the 
easternmost islands of the Indonesian 
archipelago and lies 300 miles north of 
Australia, its nearest neighbour. The western 
part of the island, formerly a Dutch colony, 
belongs to Indonesia, whereas East Timor was 
fonnore than 400 years a Portuguese colony. 
In 197 4 Portugal decolonised East Timor, 
whose newly formed political parties began 
discussing options for the future - federation 
with Portugal, independence, or integration 
with Indonesia. The Timorese Democratic 
Union (UDT) initially favoured the first 
option hut then joined a coalition with the 
nationalist liberation movement, Fretilin, to 
demand independence. A small third party, 
Apodeti, was used as a vehicle for Indonesian 
propaganda in favour of integration. 
On 11 August 1975 the UDT staged a coup 
to pre-empt Indonesian threats to intervene if 
Fretilin came to power. Ill the ensuing civil 
war, 1,500 people lost their lives. By 
September 1975, however, Fretilin was .in 
control of virtually all of Portuguese Timor, 
following the defection of Timorese colonial 
troops to the liberation movement's side. 
Indonesia, like the United States, was 
worried by the proximity of an independent 
state with radical policies and c.ontinued to 
threaten East Timor, despite previous 
assurances that Jakarta would respect the right 
of the East Timorese to independence. In 
September 1975 Indonesia closed West Timor 
to journalists and on 7 December it launched 
a full-scale invasion of East Timor with the 
knowledge of the United States and the 
encouragement of Australia. East Timor was 
proclaimed the '27th province' of Indonesia. 
The invasion and annexation of East 
Timor has been brutal: up to 200,000 people, 
a third of the population, have died as a result 
of Indonesian rule. But the majority of 
Timorese have not accepted subjugation: 
Indonesia has been unable to eliminate the 
desire of the East Timorese for self-determi-
nation and an armed resistance movement 
still remains in the hills. 
Although the invasion has been 
condemned by successive UN resolutions, 
the international community bas done little 
or nothing to implement them, given the 
major economic and geopolitical interests of 
the United States, Japan and particularly 
Australia in the region. Indonesia's crucial 
strategic location and regional status - it has 
the world's fifth largest population, and large 
reserves of oil and other natural resources -
have all encouraged the world to downplay 
East Timor's agony. 
In recent years, however, several events 
have combined to break EMt Timor's isolation 
and bring its continued occupation to inter-
national attention. In 1989 the Pope visited the 
territory and in 1991 the planned visit of a 
parliamentary delegation from Portugal, still 
considered the administering authority of 
East .Timor by the UN, created huge expec-
tations of change. To great disappointment in 
East Timor, the delegation was forced in 
October 1991 to call off its visit. 
On 12 November 1991 Indonesian troops 
shot and killed up to 300 East Timorese 
civilians during a funeral procession held at 
the Santa Cruz cemetery in Dili, the East 
Timorese capital, for a victim of repression. 
Witnessed by foreign journalists, the Santa 
Cruz massacre provided indisputable 
evidence of Indonesian atrocities. 
The Santa Cruz massacre has forced 
governments around the world to criticise 
htdonesia's brutality, injecting new impetus 
into diplomatic efforts to bring about a 
solution to East Timor's suffering. Since 1983 
the UN secretary-general has been entrusted 
with the achievement of a settlement to the 
dispute; and with the post-Cold War era 
providing a new international climate for nego-
tiations, Indonesia faces increased pressure to 
reach a solution with Portugal and the East 
Timorese under the auspices of the UN. 
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ANALYSIS 
A continuing cover-up: Balibo's genocidal 
consequences 
Between February and June 1996, 
Australia's fonner National Crime 
Authority boss, Tom Sherman, examined 
the deaths of five journalists - the 'Balibo 
Five' - in East Timor in October 1975, 
and that of Roger East on 7 December the 
same year. HUGH DOWSON looks at the 
significance of the killings and at 
evidence of a continuing cover-up. 
On 16 October 1975, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) delivered an 
advisory opinion on Western Sahara. On the 
same day at Balibo in East Timor , five 
western TV newsmen were killed. The ICJ's 
decision was followed by Morocco's invasion 
of Western Sahara, which UN efforts have yet 
to reverse. Similarly, when western powers 
failed to protest about the Balibo killings 
their silence was seen by President Suharto 
of Indonesia as tacit permission to go ahead 
with an invasion on East Timor. 
In his book A Dangerous Pwce (1978), Daniel 
Moynihan, the US ambassador to the UN in 
1975, wrote: 'In both instances the United States 
wished things to turn out as they did, and worked 
to bring this about. The Department of State 
desired the United Nations to prove utterly 
ineffective in whatever measures it undertook. 
The task was given to me, and I carried it forward 
with no inconsiderable success.' 
Leaks 
The Sherman report states that after they were 
killed by Indonesian-led troops, the bodies of 
some of the 'Balibo Five' were stripped, dressed 
in Fretilin military clothes and photographed 
beside machine guns before being incinerated. 
Did the US administration know about the 
incident? Possibly. Leaks published in Australia 
in 1982 show that the CIA's confidential 
briefings, which reached US president Gerald 
Ford every morning in 1975, gave daily updates 
from Australian sources on Indonesia's covert 
destabilisation, and then invasion, of East Timor. 
The fact that these leaks did not mention the 
' Balibo Five' suggests either that the CIA 
decided to keep news of the killings from Ford, 
or that the Australian government itself withheld 
the news, from the British government as well as 
the US. 
What is clear is that the Australian 
government obtained details of the Balibo 
killings on 16 October 1975 - as Suharto 
believed - although it claims that it first 
learned of the deaths on 20 October from an 
Indonesian newspaper. Nevertheless, similar 
information was passed to a Channel 9 
executiw by an Australian intelligence 
officer on 18 October 1975 (one of the two 
n· news teams killed was from Channel 9; it 
consisted of two British citizens, Malcolm 
Rennie and Brian Peters). 
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A much edited version of that information, or 
some other leak, reached Brian Peters's sister in 
Bristol, UK, on the same day. While there were 
at least three other leaks, Peters's sister did not 
grasp the significance of the information until 
1994 -when the disinformation endured by the 
family since 1975 began to collapse in response 
to media coverage about Balibo generated by 
the journalist John Pilger. More surprising is 
that Peters's member of parliament in 1975 -
the then secretary of state for energy Tony Benn 
- did not see through the misinformation. 
Pilger's radio interview and film - Death of a 
Nation (1994) - and the work done by those 
who have assisted Peters's family since then were 
part of a build-up of pressure that forced the 
Australian government to set up Sherman's 
'preliminary evaluation' of evidence late in 1995. 
Genocidal policies 
Impressive though the full text is, the Sherman 
report is deeply flawed. For, although Australian 
media interest ensured its publication, had it 
so much as hinted at a cover-up it would have 
been published only after heavy editing. As 
expected, the Indonesian government 
announced that the report has exonerated it 
of any role in the killings, the Australian 
government declared that nothing further could 
be done and the British government did little 
more than notify the Indonesians of Britain's 
'interest' in the issues raised. Continued inaction 
by the Australian and British governments 
inevitably gives Indonesia the impression that, 
once again, it has western permission for its 
genocidal policies. 
So the Balibo killings, which almost caused 
the cancellation oflndonesia's invasion of East 
Timor, but which led instead to full scale 
genocide, remain both invisible and centre 
stage. In these grim circumstances it is a matter 
of great importance that the Australian Section 
of the International Commission of Jurists 
(ASIC]) has decided to set up its own inquiry 
into the killings and, crucially, into the actions 
and inactions of the journalists' governments. 
To succeed, the ASIC] inquiry will need to 
obtain full details of all material released to the 
Australian government in 1975 by Indonesian 
intelligence, including precise details of the 
human remains claimed to be from four or five 
of the bodies, and the full text of the Australian 
government's official investigation, carried out 
in 1977 by Hogue and Rodgers. 
On 3 December 1996, Nobel peace prize 
winner, Jose Ramos Horta, and Australian 
human rights activist, Jim Aubrey, released 
testimonies by people who claim to have 
witnessed the burning of some of the 'Balibo 
Five'. Ramos Horta's informant claims he was 
forced to act as an executioner, and that four of 
the five were burnt alive. This allegation conflicts 
with the numerous carefully cross-referenced 
accounts of a photography session involving the 
dead bodies of at least two of the TV newsmen. 
Whatever the truth, so central is the Balibo 
cover-up to the nightmare that engulfed East 
Timor that this new confusion only strengthens 
the case for a full judicial enquiry. • 
• Hugh Dowson is Western Region 
development officer for UNA-UK. 
The Jakarta burial service on 5 or 6 December 1975, 
of the sing/,e coffin al/,egedly containing the remains 
off our or five of the Balibo Five. 
STOP PRESS 
Second bishop 
for East limor 
On 6 January 1997, Basilio do Nascimiento Martins was ordained as 
apostolic administrator of the new diocese 
of Baucau. Monsignor do Nascimiento will 
take up his post in March and is expected 
to ease the enormous workload currently 
shouldered by Bishop Belo. 
After his appointment, Monsignor do 
Nascimiento said: 'The only way to get rid of 
that discontent [in East Timor] is through 
dialogue, which I intend to keep open always.' 
He echoed Bishop Belo's insistence that the 
Timorese people must be properly consulted, 
possibly through a referendum, in any effort 
to forge peace. 
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EUROPEAN UNION 
Implementing the Common 
Position 
The European Commission is considering public health, education and cultural 
aid projects for East Timor, to be 
implemented by Timorese institutions such 
as the Catholic church, and by European 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs). 
The options have arisen following a request 
from the European Union Council of 
Ministers in November 1996 for the EC to 
make progress on implementing the 
Common Position agreed the previous 
January. 
This step towards implementing article 2.5 
of the Common Position was taken after 
prompting by the government of Portugal, 
which tabled a number of constructive 
suggestions. The government of Ireland, as 
president of the EU, supported the 
Portuguese line of action, and, although 
initially opposed by one member state and 
by the Indonesian permanent representative 
in Brussels, the initiative is now going ahead 
with full EU backing. Consultation and 
cooperation with NGOs is essential for it to be 
fully effective. 
However, a Portuguese-led initiative in 
October to send an EU statement supporting 
the Nobel peace laureates was opposed by 
some member states; and a joint Irish-
Portuguese attempt in December to get the 
EU to put pressure on the government of 
Indonesia to comply with UN human rights 
measures was described as 'untimely' by some 
member states. It remains to be seen whether 
the EU sees this option as more timely in the 
run-up to the 53rd session of the UN 
Commission on Human Rights in March and 
April this year. 
UNITED KINGDOM 
New arms sales likely 
Arms sales and bilateral development assistance 
to Indonesia have continued to attract 
controversy. On 29 November, the National 
Audit Office (NAO) published a long-awaited 
report on several mass communications, police 
training and other projects, which the Labour 
member of parliament Ann Clywd MP had 
asked about in the House of Commons in 1995. 
Although the Overseas Development Admin-
istration claimed the NAO report absolved it 
of any wrongdoing, Clywd said it strengthened 
her call for a judicial review of certain UK aid 
projects. Protests against UK arms sales to 
Indonesia during the anniversary of the 
invasion of East Timor also drew attention to 
Britain's aid and security links with the Suharto 
regime. 
Nevertheless, Ian Lang, president of the 
Board of Trade, stated in the Commons on 
21 November that he had authorised the export 
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of a further 16 Hawk fighter aircraft to 
Indonesia; and on 18 December 1996Jane's 
Defence Weekly reported that Alvis Vehicles 
received an £80 million order for exporting 
Scorpion armoured fighting ve hicles to 
Indonesia. 
By December 1996 more than 70 MPs had 
signed an early day motion calling on the UK 
government to 'seek the unconditional release 
of East Timorese people detained by the 
Indonesian government for their political views, 
and the immediate cessation of arbitrary arrest, 
torture and other violations of human rights 
by security forces' . The motion also noted that 
a group of MPs 'supports human rights 
monitoring by the United Nations but believes 
that this can be effective only if conducted from 
an office located in East Timor [ ... ]and regards 
the establishment of such systematic monitoring 
as urgent'. 
NOBEL AWARD 
Voice of the voiceless: 
Bishop Belo 
On 10 December, in Oslo, Bishop Carlos Belo and Jose Ramos Horta accepted 
the Nobel peace prize for what the Nobel 
committee Chairman, Francis Sejersted, 
called 'their long-lasting efforts to achieve a 
just and peaceful solution to the 20 year-old 
conflict in East Tim or'. Attended by more 
than 1,000 dignitaries, clerics and activists 
from around the world, the ceremony was 
boycotted by Indonesian officials. 
Accepting the prize, Bishop Belo reiterated 
that it was his duty to defend the rights of his 
peoples: 'I firmly believe that I am here 
essentially as the voice of the voiceless peoples 
of East Timor,' he said. 'Let us start by making 
a sincere effort to change the serious human 
rights situation in East Timor. The church has 
played its part. We have formed a Justice and 
Peace Commission that is always ready to 
cooperate with the authorities to address 
problems [ .. . ] As a first step, the release of East 
Timorese political prisoners has to be given 
urgent attention [ .. . ] Such a step would help 
create an important opening on the road to 
peace.' 
The bishop called for dialogue without 
delay, saying, 'Stop oppression. Stop 
violence. Stop conflict. Let us sit down 
around a table and understand each other.' 
Finally, he expressed his appreciation for 
the efforts of all those religious, secular, 
official and non-governmental organisa-
tions which have supported the search for 
peace. 
Ramos Horta 
Jose Ramos Horta echoed these expressions 
and urged the government of Indonesia and 
the international community to return to the 
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peace plan he had tabled, on behalf of the 
National Council of Maubere Resistance 
(CNRM), in 1992 (see Timor Link 36). He called 
for immediate confidence-building measures, 
such as the release of political prisoners, and for 
genuine negotiations with the resistance. He 
called on the international community to push 
for 'democratic reforms and the rule of law in 
Indonesia and for a genuine act of self-deter-
mination in East Timor'. 
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES 
APCET forced to close 
The Asia Pacific Conference on East Timor (APCET) , in November 1996 in 
Kuala Lumpur, was broken up by gangs 
linked to Malaysia 's geverning party. Many 
of the 100 foreign participants were 
arrested. All were eventually released, but 
their treatment and the enforced closing of 
the conference represented grave assaults 
on the freedoms of association and speech. 
IPJET urges Europe to act 
The general assembly of the International 
Platform of Jurists for East Timor (IPJET), 
meeting in Dublin on 8-9 November 1996, 
called on the European Union to take 
steps to promote human rights and peace 
in East Timor. IPJET members urged Irish 
officials to persuade the European Union 
to ensure ongoing monitoring and 
reporting of the situation, with the goal of 
securing the self-determination of the East 
Timorese people. 
Women profiled at 
Brussels conference 
In Brussels the 21st anniversary of the Indonesian 
invasion of East Timor was marked by 'The 
Situation ofWomen in Occupied Territories', a 
conference organised by East Timor Permanent 
Representation to the European Union and SOS 
Timor at the European Parliament. Participants 
heard about the experiences of women from 
Western Sahara, Kurdistan, and West Papua, 
and there was a testimony from Odilia Vik tor of 
East Timor. Odilia, currently living in Portugal 
after seeking asylum in the Australian embassy in 
Jakarta, told of her father's imprisonment and 
torture and how her sister was forced to be a 
virtual sex slave to Indonesian soldiers to save 
him. Participants noted that women are often 
excluded from the peace process (the UN-
organised Intra-East Timorese Dialogue has only 
one woman among its 30 participants) and that 
their needs can therefore be overlooked in social 
reconstruction phases when peace is achieved. 
Testimonies and other interventions at the 
conference will be published. 
• Many thanks to Milena Pires for contributing 
this report on the Brussels conference. 
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Bishop .Belo: the 
essentials for peace 
Since becoming apostolic administrator of 
the diocese of Dili in 1983, Bishop Belo has 
tried to promote peace in East Timor. Here, 
Reverend PAT SMYTHE summarises his 
basic demands. 
Bishop Belo maintains that there are four essential conditions for establishing a just 
and lasting peace: withdrawal of the 
Indonesian military forces ; an authentic 
referendum of the people 's political will; a 
development programme that is truly human; 
and the cessation of transmigration to East 
Timar. He has based his appeals not only on 
the Christian gospel and the social teaching 
of the Catholic church, but on the principles 
of 'Pancasila' (the ideology of the Indonesian 
Republic) which he sees being disregarded by 
the government agencies in the territory. 
The demands 
Military forces must be withdrawn because they 
are guilty of persistent and gross human rights 
abuses such as extrajudicial execution, torture, 
rape, arbitrary arrests, unlawful imprisonment, 
and 'disappearances'. Every visitor to East Timor 
who has the opportunity to listen to the 
experiences of the ordinary people hears of 
these ongoing vio lations . The people are 
intimidated, humiliated and degraded. The 
military also exercises tight control over them 
- they are not free to meet or move around 
without constant checks and supervision. And 
their right to enter and leave East Timor is 
restricted. Many of the thousands of military 
personnel supposedly engaged in 'development 
work' in the region usurp the task which rightly 
belongs to the Timorese themselves. What is 
more, the military presence is seen by the people 
as a means of intelligence gathering. Military 
personnel are also responsible for extensive theft 
from the East Timorese of personal belongings 
and national resources. For all these reasons the 
military presence creates fear and resentment: it 
is a major obstacle to a peaceful settlement. 
The fundamental right to self-<letermination 
has not yet been afforded to the East Timorese 
people and while a genuine referendum of the 
people's po Ii ti cal will is denied there will continue 
to be unrest. The vote of the so-called People's 
Assembly on 31May1976 did not fulfi l UN 
criteria for an authentic plebiscite , and the 
continuing resistance to Indonesian sovereignty 
by the great majority of the population reflects 
widespread dissatisfaction with the repressive 
rule. Even those who once favoured 'integration' 
have become disillusioned by the oppression and 
exploitation that has characterised the regime. 
East Timor needs a development programme 
that is trulY human - one that engages the people 
both in the decision-making process and in the 
necessary practical tasks. The Indonesian 
gm·ernment has allocated substantial funds to 
the "de\·elopment' of East Timor but the people 
do not benefit from the projects and remain 
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impoverished. It is crucial that East Timorese 
people occupv executiYe positions in the local 
administration . The country is being run by 
outsiders and local people who comply with 
Indonesian objectiws. The ill-fee ling and 
frustration that this generates pre\·ents the 
growth of a peaceful society. 
The arrival of thousands of economic migrants 
and government-sponsored transmigrants from 
other islands of the Indonesian archipelago is 
creating social problems. Migrants and trans-
migrants now represent nearly a quarter of the 
territory's population . These incomers receive 
favoured treatment from the authorities, and 
create competition for jobs. As a consequence, 
resentment is stirred up among the indigenous 
people, leading to public disorder. The great 
majority of these new arrivals are western 
Indonesians and Muslims, which means that 
their very presence inevitably affects the cultural 
character of local society. The East Timorese 
feel their identity as a nation is threatened. Such 
insecurities are the seeds of continuing social 
conflict. The tensions are not to do with religious 
intolerance but with social injustice. Until this 
injustice is remedied there will be no peace in 
East Timor. 
Appeal to principles of Pancasila 
Bishop Belo has been vilified in the Indonesian 
media for insisting that these matters be addressed 
honestly by the Indonesian government. But 
accusations that he is 'disloyal' are misplaced. In 
the 13 years he has been in office, Belo has 
frequently appealed to Indonesia's own constitu-
tion in support of his criticisms. He maintains that 
the principles of 'Pancasila' - which include 
humanitarianism, democracy through consulta-
tion, and social justice - have been violated in East 
Timor by the very authorities that should be 
upholding them. He has also called for the fine 
balance expressed in the national motto 'Bhinneka 
tunggal ika' (Unity in diversity) to be honoured 
through proper respect for Timorese cultural and 
religious identity. If the regime itself betrays the 
ideals of the Indonesian republic, any possible 
progress towards real peace in the region is 
undermined. 
Bishop Carws Bew: Th£ principl.es of 'Pancasil,a ' have 
been violated in East Timar l7y the very authorities 
that should be uphol,ding them. 
UK and Ireland Bishops 
speak out 
On 15 November 1996, the Catholic 
Bishops of England and Wales issued the 
following statement on East Timor: 
'The Catholic Bishops of England and Wales 
warmly welcome the award of the Nobel Peace 
Prize to Bishop Carlos Ximenes Belo, Apostolic 
Administrator ofDili, as a recognition of his vital 
efforts to promote peace in East Timor. Yet we 
are concerned about ongoing human rights 
violations and increasing inter-religious tensions 
in East Timor, about the lack of real progress 
in the Tripartite Talks and in the All-inclusive 
Intra-East Timorese Dialogue under United 
Nations auspices. 
'We urge the government of Indonesia to 
respect its obligations under international law 
and take significant steps towards peace. We also 
call on the United Kingdom, its European Union 
(EU) partners and the United Nations (UN) to 
press for the establishment of an effective UN 
human rights presence in East Timor, and to 
encourage the parties to make real progress in 
the talks aimed at forging a just, comprehen-
sive, internationally acceptable solution to the 
confli ct, which fully respects the legitimate 
aspirations of the Timorese people. The 
Conference encourages the Catholic community 
to pray for Bishop Belo and all those working 
for these goals. ' 
In December, the Bishops of Ireland issued 
their own message. Here are excerpts from their 
statement. 
'Today, 10 December 1996, the Nobel Peace 
Prize is awarded to the Roman Catholic Bishop of 
East Timor, Carlos Filipe Ximenes Belo for his 
unstinting commitment to peace,justice and the 
defence of human rights in East Timor. On this 
occasion, the members of the Irish Conference of 
Catholic Bishops wish to welcome the recognition 
given to the work of Bishop Belo and Jose Ramos 
Horta and to express their solidarity and their 
support to the people of East Timor. 
'We further urge that the Irish government: 
• work with their EU partners to immediately 
implement the EU Common Position on East 
Timor with concrete actions [ ... ] 
• encourage the parties to initiate genuine talks 
aimed at forging a just, comprehensive and 
internationally accepted solution to the 
conflict which fully respects the legitimate 
aspirations of self-determination of the East 
Timorese people 
• direct aid via non-governmental organisations 
working in development and human rights 
inside the territory in absence of any legitimate 
authority in East Timor 
• work to strengthen the capacity for human 
rights monitoring and advocacy inside East 
Timor through the establishment of a UN 
Human Rights office in Dili answerable to the 
UN Commission in Geneva. 
• demand the withdrawal of the Indonesian 
military from East Timor's territory. ' • 
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Reason for 
a retrial? 
An International Court of Justice (ICJJ 
ruling on 30 June 1995 effectively denied 
Portugal the right to raise international 
claims on behalf of East Timor. Although 
this appears to rule out any possibility of 
an international legal decision to support 
and advance East Timor's cause, as 
Dr IAIN SCOBBIE argues, a revision of 
the ICJ judgement may be possible if 
swift action is taken. 
East Timor is not a state and so cannot appear before the Court on its own 
accord. And, in the wake of the ICJ decision, 
there appears to be no state that can speak 
on its behalf. Yet there might be grounds for 
re-opening the case. 
Portugal's opportunity to raise a case came 
after the Timor Gap Treaty between Australia 
and Indonesia in 1989. Portugal complained 
that Australia had breached East Timor's 
right to sovereignty over its natural resources 
by concluding the treaty, and also that it had 
breached rights owed to Portugal. It argued 
that, because it had been appointed by the 
United Nations (UN) as administering power 
over East Timor, Portugal had the right and 
responsibility to be involved in the conduct 
of East Timor's foreign affairs, something 
which Australia had unlawfully ignored. 
The argument for revising the ICJ decision 
rests on Australia's view of Portugal's legal 
capacity as the administering power. Australia 
said at the ICJ that Portugal was empowered 
merely to cooperate with the UN on self-
determination for EasfTimor, but that it did 
not have the right to organise and conduct a 
self-determination exercise, and possessed no 
legal right or interest in East Timor's affairs. 
During the oral hearing of 8 February 1995 
Henry Burmester, counsel for Australia, 
stated: 
As soon as Indonesia appeared on the 
horizon, Portugal scurried away. It left the 
people of East Timor to determine their 
future by themselves. Portugal says it never 
relinquished its powers as administering 
power. But the facts show that it did so. [It] 
cannot restore legal rights previously 
abandoned [ ... ] 
Further, Australia argued that Portugal 
sought to defend the self-determination 'of a 
people over whom it has no form of control 
whatsoever and who themselves rejected any 
such role at the time Portugal voluntarily 
left' . 
However, shortly after the oral proceeding, 
but before the ICJ delivered judgement on 
30 June 1995, the Australian Refugee Review 
Tribunal decided that in certain 
circumstances indigenous East Timorese 
people are entitled to Portuguese nationality 
and, therefore, are not entitled to refugee 
status in Australia. The Refugee Review 
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Tribunal effectively said that Portugal was 
responsible for the protection of an 
indigenous East Timorese person, and could 
do so, for instance, by taking international 
legal action. 
However, at the ICJ, Australia argued that 
Portugal was not entitled to protect the rights 
of the East Timorese people as a whole - for 
instance, by acting to defend their rights to 
sovereignty over natural resources. Under 
international law , both statements are 
attributable to the Australian government, 
but they are completely contradictory. 
Tribunal cases 
The earliest relevant case in which the 
Refugee Review Tribunal ruled that East 
Timorese people were entitled to Portuguese 
nationality (and thus ineligible for refugee 
status in Australia) was V93/01000, delivered 
on 29 May 1995 by MW Gerkens. Eleven days 
before, in award V93/00971, Gerkens had 
upheld a plea from five East Timorese people 
to be recognised as refugees without 
considering whether they were entitled to 
Portuguese nationality. In making the award 
V93/01000, Gerkens stated: 
The Tribunal is obliged [ ... ] to investigate 
and determine all reasonably foreseeable 
issues relevant to the determination of a 
claimant's application. In the present 
application, the claimed places of birth (ie 
East Timor and Macao) plus the fact that, 
in his original application for refugee 
status, applicant 1 actually claims to have 
been a Portuguese citizen at birth , raises 
the issue whether persons coming from East 
Timor who are applicants for protection 
visas [ ... ] and who claim a real chance of 
persecution by the Indonesian authorities 
in East Timor are citizens of Portugal and 
therefore ineligible under Article 1A(2) of 
the [Refugees] Convention for the 
protection of Australia unless they have a 
well-founded fear of Convention based 
persecution in [Portugal] 
It is not clear why the question of the 
applicants' nationality was not an equally 
'reasonably foreseeable issue' 11 days earlier 
in V93/00971. It might be that the reference 
to Portuguese citizenship at birth in 
V93/01000 was sufficient to alert Gerkens to 
its importance. 
However, in the proceedings leading up to 
award N93/00952 (made on 7 February 
1996), a tribunal member, P Fergus, had 
raised the question of nationality. Similarly, 
in case N93/00294, oral hearings which dwelt 
on nationality had been held on 14 October 
1994, 15 December 1994 and 28 March 1995. 
Indeed, in his decision in N93/00952, Fergus 
noted that in late 1993 he and another 
tribunal member, 'who was dealing with a 
similar matter', had actively sought the 
guidance of an expert, Professor Moura 
Ramos of the University of Coimbra, on the 
entitlement of East Timorese people to 
Portuguese nationality. Fergus also noted 
that he had been asked to refer another case 
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involving East Timorese nationality to th e 
Administrative Appeals Tribunal , on the 
grounds that it was an important principle or 
an issue of general application. In mid 1995, 
the Australian department of immigration 
and ethnic affairs asked the tribunal to defer 
the East Timorese decisions because it 
wanted to make a submission on nationality 
issues, which it did on 11 October 1995. 
The change in Gerkens's attitude may have 
been a result of advice given by the 
Australian government to the tribunal. 
Burmester delivered two legal opinions 
setting out the views of the department of 
immigration and ethnic affairs, on 27 April 
1995 and on 20 September 1995. In 
subsequent cases, V94/01545 (3 May 1996) 
and V94/02118 (15 May 1996), a tribunal 
member, Vrachnas, stated: 
The position of the Department is set out 
by Mr Burmester in his opinions of 27 April 
and 20 September 1995. He concludes that 
East Timorese are nationals of both 
[Indonesia and Portugal] 
Nationality 
International law does not regulate 
nationality directly; the principles on which 
states grant nationality to individuals is 
regulated by domestic law. Yet international 
law does impose limitations on a state's 
power to confer nationality. In the 
Nottebohm case in 1955, the International 
Court classified nationality as: 
a legal bond having as its basis a social fact 
of attachment, a genuine connection of 
existence, interests and sentiments, 
together with the existence of reciprocal 
rights and duties. It may be said to 
constitute a juridical expression of the fact 
that the individual upon whom it is 
conferred, either directly by the law or as 
the result of an act of the authorities, is in 
fact more closely connected with the 
population of the State conferring 
nationality than with that of any other State. 
Before the ICJ, the Australian government 
argued that Portugal had 'abandoned its last 
link with' East Timor in 1975 but, before the 
Court had ruled on this it argued before its 
Refugee Review Tribunal that Portugal was 
'the State which assumes defence [of East 
Timorese] by means of protection as against 
other States'. These views are inconsistent. 
A matter of urgency 
Article 61 of the Court's statute says: 
An application for revision of a judgement 
may be made only when it is based upon 
the discovery of some fact of such a nature 
as to be a decisive factor, which fact was, 
when the judgement was given, unknown to 
the Court and also to the party claiming 
revision, always provided that such 
ignorance was not due to negligence. 
An application for revision must be made within 
six months of the discovery of the new fact and 
within 10 years of the date of the judgement. 
Australia's recognition of the Portuguese 
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nationality of East Timorese peo ple is a 
decisive fact because it undermines the basis of 
its own arguments before the !CJ Only once 
before has a state tried to have a judgement 
re\ised, and in that case the fact relied on was 
not decisiw. But these circumstances are 
different. It h as not been possible to 
determine whether Burmester's opinion of 
27 Ap1il 1995 was in the public domain when 
it was deJi,ered to the tribunal, for V93/ 0IOOO 
was delivered only a month before the ICJ 
ga\'e its judgement, and reports of judicial 
cases and awards are not usually issued 
immediateh· to the public. Therefore, the 
important question is whether Portugal should 
have known of it immediately and approached 
the !CJ before judgement to point out the 
inconsistency in Australia's legal position. 
Other considerations must be taken into 
account before the value of revision 
proceedings can be fully assessed. But this 
should occur as a matter of urgency. Under 
Article 61, time is running out. • 
• Dr lain Scobbie is senior lecturer at the 
School of Law, University of Glasgow, 
Scotland. 
Note: texts of all the awards of the Australian 
Refugee Review Tribunal referred to in this 
paper have been drawn from the Australian 
Legal Information Institute website -
http:/ /www.austlii .edu.au/ 
NEW PUBLICATIONS 
Australian agenda for 
action 
In October 1996 Community Aid Abroad (CAA), a member of Oxfam International, 
released a lobby document titled East Timar: 
An Agenda for Action. The paper aims to get 
the Australian government more actively 
involved in promoting peace. It includes an 
analysis of the situation inside East Timor, 
the broader picture in Indonesia, responses 
by the int e rnational community , the 
promise of conflict resolution and policy 
options for Australia. CAA recommends that 
the government of Australia: 
1. Step up diplomatic support for UN 
involvement at all levels , with particular 
emphasis on achieving the recommenda-
tions made bv the UN High Commis-
sioner for Human Rights. 
2. Develop and co-ordinate an international 
forum of like-minded countries to 
mobilise for a peaceful solution in East 
Timor. 
3. A.dvocate a gradual but sustained and 
monitored reduction of Indonesian troops 
from East Timor and urge the East 
Timorese resistance leadership to cease 
military activity in response. 
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-!. Urge and offer training in international 
human rights standards to all military and 
police stationed in East Timor. 
5. Adrncate and offer support for the 
development of an economic decen-
tralisation stra tegy to address the 
economic and social problems troubling 
East Timor. 
6. Review the policy of the Austra li an 
government to include a reference to the 
right of the East Timorese people to self-
determination. 
For copies of East Timar: An Agenda for 
A ction contact Christine Wheeler at CAA, 
GPO Box 1000 , Sydney 1043, Australia . 
Tel: +612 264 1169. Fax: +612 264 1476. 
The continuing betrayal 
The policy recommendations are 
complentary to those made by CUR in the 
Comment it published on East Timor in 
Sptember 1996. Reader's will recall CIIR's 
recommendations for the international 
community to: 
1. Call for the unconditional release of 
prisoners detained for their political views 
and for the immediate cessation of arbitrary 
arrest, torture and other violations of 
international human rights law by security 
forces in East Timor. 
2. Encourage the Indonesian government to 
launch a proper, impartial inquiry into past 
human rights violations, especially the Santa 
Cruz massacre, in order to reso lve the 
circumstances surrounding extrajudicial 
executions and disappearances. 
Compensation sho uld be accorded to 
families of victims. 
3. Support rigorous, impartial on-site human 
rights monitoring by the United Nations 
and press for regular, unhindered access to 
East Timor by non-governmental human 
rights organisations. 
4. Press for an immediate reduction of 
Indonesian troops deployed in East Timor, 
and their eventual withdrawal in the context 
of a comprehensive settlement. 
5. Support the Tripartite Talks under the aegis 
of the UN secretary-general, while pressing 
for substantial progress towards a just, and 
comprehensive settlement, in lin e with 
international law and the will of the 
Timorese people. 
6. Encourage the parties seriously to consider 
the peace plan put forward by the National 
Council of Maubere Resistance (CNRM) as 
a framework for resolving the conflict. 
7. Support the continuation of the All-
inclusive Intra-East Timorese Dialogue 
under UN auspices, while pressing for the 
inclusion of all recognised East Timorese 
leaders, including Xanana Gusmao, in the 
talks. 
8. Provide development assistance to East 
Timor through local church and non-
governmental organisations, rather than 
through governmental agencies. 
9. Restrict arms sales to Indonesia and reYiew 
broader aid, trade, investment and military 
cooperatio n re lations if there is no 
meaningful move ment forward by the 
government of Indonesia on the question of 
East Timor. 
East Timor - The ro11ti11uing betrayal is available 
from CIIR's Publications section, priced £2.50 
plus packing and postage. ISBN 18528715 12. 
Indonesian forums 
The Australian Counci l for Overseas Aid has 
recently released several publications which 
will be of interest to Indonesia-watchers. 
Freeport in Indonesia: Reconciling development 
and indigenous rights and Workers in Indonesia: 
Prisoners of progress are reports on public 
forums held in Canberra in April 1996. The 
July-September 1996 issue of Inside Indonesia 
contains a set of shorter papers presented at 
the 10th conferen ce of the International 
NGO Forum on Indonesia (INFID), also in 
April 1996. 
Copies can be obtained from ACFOA, 
124 Napier St, Fitzroy VIC, 3065, Australia. 
Tel 639 417 7505. Fax 639 416 2746. 
Peter Carey's monograph, East Timar: Third 
World Colonialism and the Struggle for National 
Identity, was published as a special issue of 
Conflict Studies in October-November 1996. 
It can be ordered from th e Researc h 
In sti tute for the Study on Confl ic t and 
T e r rorism (RISCT), 136 Baker Street, 
London WlM lFH, UK. Tel +44 171 224 
2659. Fax +44 171 486 3064. • 
Timar Link 
Subscription form 
D I wish to subscribe to Timor Link 
D I enclose my subscription fee of £ __ 
Address ____ ______ ·---
Individual £10.00 for 4 issues 
Institution £20.00 for 4 issues 
D I have previously subscribed to Timor 
Link 
D I am a new subscriber 
Please send cheques made payable to CllR 
to East Timor Project, c/ o CIIR, Unit 3, 
Canonbury Yard, l 90A New North Road, 
London NI 7BJ, UK. 
Tel 0171-354 0883, fax 0171-359 0017. 
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